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Abstract: Academic discussions of development continue to grow, yet critical engagements with communities 
affected by development interventions remain limited. Drawing from life history interviews conducted in southern 
Tanzania, this article details the varied experiences of development interventions among older people and how 
these affect broader understandings of progress. Many juxtapose their negative views of ujamaa villagization with 
more positive recollections of previous interventions (especially the Groundnut Scheme), which are infused with 
what is described here as “development nostalgia.” Perceptions of the past clearly inform the social, political, 
and economic aspirations forwarded today, with the richness of the constructed narratives adding further nuance 
to existing depictions of Tanzanian historiography. 
 
 
Much of the academic work on the subject of development tends to focus on the present and 
the future, despite the fact that experiences from the past are crucial in shaping localized 
understandings of progress (Crewe & Harrison 1998). Drawing from in-depth fieldwork in 
southern Tanzania, this article aims to address a point raised twenty years ago by Jonathan 
Crush: that “we still do not know enough about the global, regional and especially local 
historical geography of development” (1995:8–9). Conventional histories of Tanzania, and of 
Tanzanian development, tend to offer teleological versions of the past, reflecting Kelly 
Askew’s (2006) threefold division of the presocialist, socialist, and postsocialist eras in recent 
Tanzanian history. Periodizations of history, of course, are “utterly relative constructs, [which] 
reflect their own sense of the ‘style’ of the historical past” (Toohey 2003:10). Nevertheless this 
three-part division is the general way in which Tanzanian history is typically understood. And 
with the one caveat that it is necessary to consider how these periods are “materially, 
ideologically and rhetorically related to each other” (Askew 2006:16), this general approach 
does seem reasonable, given that thirty years have elapsed since the formal conclusion of 
socialism in Tanzania with the first Structural Adjustment Program introduced in 1986, 
following roughly a quarter of a century with Julius Nyerere as president. However, those who 
have lived through these times tend not to carve up the past in such a manner, and as Lawi 
(2005) asserts, nationalist readings of Tanzanian history which focus on these and other 
milestones often reflect largely urban and elite experiences as opposed to the lives of the rural 
majority. Ellis (2002), for example, questions whether independence is a sensible historical 
marker outside of urban areas across much of Africa, 
 
Indeed, from the perspective of the wazee (i.e., elders), whose narratives of development 
are at the centre of this research, the 1967 Arusha Declaration can be regarded as more 
significant than national independence as a turning point in Tanzanian historiography (see 
Havnevik 1993; Jennings 2003).1 The Arusha Declaration brought about fundamental changes 
in the structure of the relatively newly independent country and instigated the twin processes 
of economic nationalization and rural collectivization (especially in the guise of what has 
become known as “villagization”) that materially changed their lives. With regard to the latter 
process, negative memories of the 1970s dominated many of the discussions that I had with 
wazee in southern Tanzania, who often argued that the conditions of everyday life have “gone 
backwards” (-rudi nyuma) since this process was instituted. By contrast, many see the “past”—
i.e., the period before the state-led process of ujamaa villagization—as a time of infrastructural 
improvements, employment opportunities, cheaper commodities, and stability: as a time, that 
is, more closely associated with progress than the present. This point of view serves to inform 
contemporary readings of maendeleo (a close Swahili equivalent of “development”), while also 
illuminating broader discussions of Tanzanian historiography. 
 
The article begins with a discussion of the research project and fieldwork sites on which it 
is based and then moves on to a discussion of maendeleo. It addresses the notion of nostalgia 
specifically in terms of experiences of material advancement in “the past” and how this informs 
perceptions of development. It then outlines the postcolonial formation of ujamaa villages and 
examines the impact of this massive government-led experiment in social reorganization. This 
is then placed alongside some of the more favourable views that are held regarding the 
opportunities and life chances—and particularly the material advancements—that are 
associated with the period traversing independence and prior to villagization. While 
exploitative colonial relations were highlighted by informants during the fieldwork study, these 
were seen as preferable to the apparent ostracism of the Mtwara region prior to the infamous 
Groundnut Scheme and following the pernicious impact of villagization. This article reflects 
on contemporary forms of “development nostalgia” in southern Tanzania, in which perceptions 
of “the past” inform social, political, and economic aspirations of wazee, and it seeks to add to 
existing discussions of Tanzanian historiography. 
 
 
The Research Process and Fieldwork Sites 
 
This research project was the outcome of a number of conversations regarding maendeleo in 
the coastal village of Mikindani, situated twelve kilometres outside of the regional capital of 
Mtwara. This village was the main administrative centre in southern Tanganyika until the late 
1940s, when it was replaced by the newly established town of Mtwara, built as part of the 
colonial Groundnut Scheme and subsequently connected to Nachingwea in the interior by a 
railway that passed through Mikindani. The construction of the Mtwara port and of the railway 
dramatically increased wage labour during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Rizzo 2006). While 
not an officially designated ujamaa village in the 1970s, Mikindani was affected by migration 
flows across Mtwara region before, during, and after the villagization processes were enacted 
in the 1970s (Lal 2010) and has also witnessed the establishment of a number of European 
NGOs espousing development over the past fifteen years. 
 
The other fieldwork site, Dihimba, is also on the railway that was established to the interior 
(but has not run since the 1950s). Dihimba was more directly affected by villagization 
processes, given that the ujamaa village of Mpondomo was established within the existing 
parameters of Dihimba in 1972. It is around forty kilometres inland from Mikindani and is 
remote in comparison; it has minimal phone reception and no electricity, and is accessible only 
via an unpaved road with limited access by public transport. Dihimba had a population of 
around four thousand at the time of the research, while Mikindani had around eleven thousand 
residents. Cashew nuts are the principal cash crop, and while agriculture remains the main 
source of employment in each village, many in Mikindani also depend on fishing for their 
livelihoods (URT 2009). These fieldwork sites are not meant to be representative of the entire 
Mtwara region, yet I felt that they were both sufficiently similar, and also different enough, to 
facilitate a productive comparison. 
 
Socialist villagization processes affected southern Tanzania more than any other area 
during the 1970s (Killian 2003) and this, coupled with the widely held perception that Mtwara 
has been deliberately marginalized by central government (Seppälä & Koda 1998), made the 
region an ideal choice for this research project. This article emanated from an original intention 
to construct life history narratives (Ahearne 2011) that detail historical processes that are 
simultaneously regional, national, and global, and it is through these accounts that a strong 
sense of development nostalgia emerges. The decision to focus on wazee was partly informed 
by postcolonial theories and reflects a desire to foreground the voices of subalterns who are 
often marginalized, particularly concerning interpretations of development (Reef 2008; Spivak 
1999) and projects established in the name thereof. Older people do not, however, represent a 
homogeneous group, and participants ranged from sixty-five to ninety years old, with some 
generational differences witnessed when it came to memories of wage labor in the late-colonial 
period and in terms of the recollections of villagization. Striking a balance in the number of 
interviewees conducted with women and men was also difficult, but of the sixty semi-
structured interviews drawn from in the discussion here, twenty-four were conducted with 
women while the eight focus groups were mixed. The fieldwork took place across every ward 
of both villages during a pre-fieldwork study in 2008 (two months), with the longer period of 
study taking place in 2009 and 2010 (and lasting for ten months in total). Beyond this, some 
conversations from a later research trip in 2012 (over the course of three months) were drawn 
on, alongside a great deal of participant observation. All interviews were conducted in Swahili 
and recorded, and then transcribed and translated as soon as possible after completion. 
 
 
Development, Nostalgia, and “Development Nostalgia” 
 
Development is a notoriously difficult word to translate, and the close Kiswahili equivalent of 
maendeleo—rooted in the verb -endelea (to go forward) and reflecting an etymological 
connection with progress—is employed here. Maendeleo is a term that has elsewhere been seen 
as highly relevant to localized readings of progress in Tanzania (Marsland 2007). Much like 
the word development, it is a crucially important part of the postcolonial political lexicon while 
remaining highly contested. While it is “widely used in East Africa and often denotes similar 
ideas about development and progress, maendeleo is not a unitary, fixed discourse over time 
and space, but rather is mutable, contingent, and open to local reinterpretation and 
appropriation” (Mercer 2002:111). Maendeleo resonates with the socialist political and 
economic thought of Julius Nyerere and is related to terms like kujitegemea (self-reliance), 
kushirikiana (cooperation), and umoja (unity), all of which figure heavily in the ideology of 
ujamaa (“familyhood”) (Harrison 2008; Hunter 2008). As Green (2000) explains further, the 
term is often used to refer to interventions by external agents (especially in relation to projects 
established by NGOs) and small-scale private investments alike. Today less emphasis tends to 
be placed on the role that the government ought to play in development, although the apparent 
absence of development is still blamed on a state unwilling to support its (rural) constituents. 
For wazee in particular, the largely negative outcomes of villagization processes have led many 
to challenge the appropriateness of collectivization and have had a significant impact on their 
perceptions of development. For these elders, notions of maendeleo are connected to what are 
viewed as failed state interventions, which “left people poorer and more bereft than they had 
been prior to villagization” (Green 2000:77). 
 
Many development professionals now tend to prioritize individual, small-scale material 
advancement over collective benefit, a new emphasis which, as Pitcher and Askew (2006:11) 
thoughtfully remind us, tends to emphasize the “self” in self-reliance. It is clear that small-scale 
material improvements in people’s lives are often conceived of as development in Tanzania, 
with “houses made of udongo (mud-sticks-fronds with a thatched roof)” often deemed 
symbolic of a lack of progress, while owning “a matofali house (a stronger structure made of 
permanent bricks with corrugated iron sheets) is a clear sign that one has advanced in life” 
(Kamat 2008:372). Such changes do have practical significance, in terms of the ability to store 
grain during wet seasons (Da Corta & Price 2009), but it is apparent that material improvements 
to housing also play a more public, symbolic role as representations of progress across many 
parts of eastern and southern Africa (Ferguson 2006; Morton 2007). This is reflected by the 
informant below who, like many others, stressed the connection between his perception of 
development and visible evidence (and the lack thereof) of material advancement: “You see 
my house? There are big holes here, no doors, and a leaking roof. I don’t like it but they are 
there because I don’t have development” (M. Kidume, interview, Mikindani, April 28, 2009). 
According to another informant, “Development means to succeed, to prosper. . . . If so, I will 
improve my house or have a big farm with cows. But for us there is nothing” (F. Selemani, 
interview, Mikindani, October 9, 2009). 
 
These comments echo a notion that was referred to critically in a number of interviews of 
“maendeleo ya mtu binafsi,” or “personal/self(ish) development,” which Green (2000) found 
to be prevalent elsewhere in southern Tanzania as well. This concern is linked to widespread 
criticism of the communal approach to development and especially agriculture in the 1970s. 
Agriculture remains the main source of employment in the Mtwara region, with cashew nuts 
crucial to the regional economy and representing the main opportunity for increased individual 
wealth (Mashindano et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the absence of promised government support 
in the form of subsidies, and the unavailability of affordable pesticides, fertilizers, and high-
quality farming tools reduces the possibility of extracting the greatest possible value and 
provokes further resentment toward the government. This antipathy toward the government, 
and its apparent failure to support rural peoples in southern Tanzania, is evident in the argument 
that things have effectively gone backwards (- rudi nyuma) since villagization. 
 
Nostalgic representations of “the past” and conditions of life prior to this process are also 
exceptionally common on the part of women and men who associate “the past,” the time of 
their youth, with maendeleo. It is of course necessary, as Sanders (2008) points out, to 
acknowledge that difficulties arise when scholars attempt to specify the precise relations 
between past and present, and that reliance on binaries of “then and now” within anthropology 
often tend to valorize the past and circumscribe the possibilities of the present. Other scholars 
have argued as well that colonial or imperial nostalgia is a particularly Western issue (Rosaldo 
1989), especially within the discipline of anthropology (Ferguson 2006). This article does not 
suggest that a quantifiable rupture exists between past and present, but only that such 
perceptions exist among many elders and are worth examining; as Bissell argues, instead of 
provoking reactions of “embarrassment or distaste,” (colonial) nostalgia ought to be considered 
along with other cultural phenomena in order to uncover the specific “social and political 
desires [that] postcolonial Africans [are] giving voice to when they speak well of the colonial 
past” (2005:217). Moreover, nostalgia represents “a cultural practice, not a given content; its 
forms, meanings, and effects shift with the context—it depends on where the speaker stands in 
the landscape of the present. . . . [It is] an essential narrative function of language that orders 
events temporally and dramatizes them” (Stewart 1998:227). Ferguson’s (1999) analysis of 
workers on the Zambian Copperbelt and their association of progress with past practices and 
experiences is a seminal work in this regard. Another important study is Piot’s (2010) 
ethnographic account of Togo since the conclusion of the Cold War, especially his concept of 
“nostalgia for the future.” Effectively reversing the common assertion that nostalgia relates 
only to the past, he demonstrates that many Togolese now express nostalgia for what is yet to 
be seen, an uncertain and elusive future that is marked by the possibilities presented by “a 
thousand development initiatives that hail youth and leave elders behind” (2010:20). It is 
important, then, to consider the ways in which nostalgia relates not only to the past but also to 
aspirations for the future and how the very “capacity to aspire,” in the words of Appadurai 
(2004), is culturally contingent and directly informed by life experiences. 
 
This study, therefore, looks at nostalgia as a cultural practice that allows for the expression 
of certain social and political desires and material aspirations that serve to complicate localized 
and national narratives of development and history in Tanzania. While backward looking, 
nostalgia nevertheless demonstrates a desire for a better future. It is of course relatively 
common for older people to view the past as a more stable and fixed time than the present and 
to experience the present as marked by a general sense of “longing and loss” (Bissell 2005:225), 
“the feeling that everyday life no longer has its taken-for-grantedness” (Werbner 1998:1). As 
one informant stated, “things [in Mtwara] did not change in the past, we just lived. We had a 
government but we knew nothing about that, we didn’t know about these things until the British 
left and the government forced all of us to move” (M. Masoudi, interview, Dihimba, June 8, 
2009). In the case of wazee in Mtwara, however, this kind of generalized nostalgia is also 
connected to a series of specific historical experiences—such as villagization—that created a 
clear break with the past and generated huge and often unrealistic expectations. The fact that 
these have not been met has therefore led many to invoke past experiences of intervention and 
processes of change as clearer indicators of development. 
 
 
Experiencing Ujamaa: “They Destroyed Our Farms to Build Something Called the 
Nation” 
 
Among wazee in Mikindani and Dihimba, the perceived stability that was disrupted by 
villagization was associated with the time traversing the late colonial and early postcolonial 
periods (roughly the 1940s to the 1970s), and particularly with some of the material 
transformations brought about by late colonial development policy. These changes were the 
outcome, at least in part, of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which brought 
about salutary investment in Britain’s African colonies (Van Beusekom & Hodgson 2000) 
elsewhere described as akin to a “second colonial occupation” (Hodge 2007). In emphasizing 
the continuities rather than the differences between these two supposedly distinct eras, many 
older Mtwarans are aligned with a number of scholars who argue against perceived dichotomies 
that seek to separate colonial and postcolonial eras (see, e.g., Abrahamsen 2000; Cooper 1997; 
Jennings 2003; Van Beusekom & Hodgson 2000). While Ranger (1996:273) rightly challenges 
the “disconcerting preference” among many contemporary Africans for the “apparent 
authoritarian stabilities and disciplines of colonial systems that were much less coherent, 
simple and lucid than such dualism suggests”—the matter of perceived colonial stabilities does 
not need to be emphasized here. Of most significance here are the regular references of the 
wazee to “the past” as a time prior to the social and economic ruptures associated with forced 
resettlement. 
 
The 1967 Arusha Declaration of the Tanzania African National Union (TANU) defined 
many of the socialist policies of at least the following decade and therefore represents an 
extremely significant document, and moment, in Tanzanian history (see Jennings 2008). Along 
with the major program of nationalization that it initiated, one of the principal outcomes was 
villagization, the massive social experiment emanating from central government (and espoused 
in Nyerere’s writings) which effectively sought to restructure society and reorganize rural life 
through the voluntary migration of rural people from small villages into new and more sizeable 
communal villages. The process intensified during the 1970s, which saw a dramatic increase 
in the size and population of many existing places (with Dihimba one such example), alongside 
the formation of new ujamaa villages. One of the guiding principles of villagization was that 
communal farming would improve agricultural productivity and would therefore guarantee 
long-term food security and self-sufficiency. Another assumption was that an otherwise 
unreachable rural population must be relocated in order to receive “services, such as schools, 
safe water, and health facilities” (Schneider 2007:12). 
 
Migration to ujamaa villages was initially voluntary. Nyerere (1973) declared that forcing 
people to move would not be countenanced by the state since it undermined one of the 
fundamental principles of villagization— that it was to be a voluntary process. Nevertheless, 
when only 15 percent of the total population chose to resettle between 1969 and 1973, TANU, 
in what was then a constitutionally inscribed one-party state (Brennan 2006), reversed its 
position. According to one informant, at first only those without material resources moved 
voluntarily, since promised future services did not provide enough of an incentive to leave 
behind farms and houses: “At the start people decided whether to go. Many stayed with their 
wealth; buildings, cashew nut trees, coconut trees and mango trees. People who had nothing 
went to cooperate, to build, and to live in ujamaa villages. Then the government forced 
everyone to go” (A. Ali, interview, Mikindani, February 10, 2010). In 1973 TANU decreed 
that “to live in villages is an order” (Bernstein 1981:45), rapidly transforming voluntary 
migration “into mass resettlement, ujamaa into villagization” (Jennings 2002:511–12). 
Mamdani (1996:176) adds that increased authoritarianism in Tanzania from the late 1960s 
onward was in fact akin to “decentralized despotism,” reflecting the continuities of colonial 
modes of rule within postcolonial structures of power (see also Jennings 2008). 
 
Today wazee in Mikindani and Dihimba consistently argue that migration was involuntary. 
Many also recall it as a brutal process involving violent removal from their land and the 
destruction of property by the police and security services; according to one informant, “people 
were moved by force, the soldiers came, they came to worry the people, and they were taken, 
all of their things were destroyed or put in a truck” (A. H. Barakati, interview, Dihimba, May 
8, 2009). This informant made it clear that she was not opposed to the principle of rural 
collectivization per se, although being forced to move to Dihimba and witnessing the 
destruction of family crops by security forces certainly informed her viewpoint. For many 
people, in fact, villagization was a de facto “nationalization of poverty” (Green 2000). One 
informant directly blamed former President Nyerere for “destroy[ing] our farms and the houses 
of people who were living in the wilderness, forcing them to come together to build something 
that he called the nation” (H. Musa, interview, Mikindani, July 22, 2009). 
 
It is possible that the most harmful and pernicious methods of forced relocation were the 
actions of “over-zealous officials” (Jennings 2002:513). Not all of the sixty interviewees whose 
narratives are drawn from in this article recalled villagization with such hostility, confirming 
Lal’s (2010:14–15) finding in other parts of Mtwara that while some do recall being forcibly 
loaded onto vehicles by soldiers “threatening to burn or destroy their homes and property . . . 
[,] others merely recall a benign order to relocate.” The views presented here, therefore, tend 
to favour Schneider’s (2007) contention that villagization, far from a monolithic form of 
national scientific socialism (see, e.g., Scott 1998), was far less centrally planned and more 
arbitrary than had previously been assumed. Nevertheless, the first-hand experiences of 
villagization certainly had a profound and lasting impact on many of the wazee, especially 
those who recall being forced to relocate and who generally view the destruction of private 
property as central to villagization. 
 
Their views are also informed, undoubtedly, by the actual effects of villagization. Despite 
the objective of food security, what followed was a national food crisis. Once the migratory 
process became compulsory, the production of food by the newly resettled rural majority was 
reduced dramatically (Wembah-Rashid 1998), and the country went from being one of the 
largest exporters of agricultural products in Africa to the largest importer by 1976 (Maier 
1998). Acute food shortages were also experienced across the country between 1973 and 1976, 
lasting in some regions to the 1980s (Ergas 1980). One of the reasons for the dramatic reduction 
in food production, according to one informant, was a lack of incentives: “People didn’t work 
hard and prepare new farms quickly because they were scared these would be destroyed like 
the old farms. The village chairman told us not to plant more than five trees in the ujamaa 
village because we might be moved again” (M. Musa, interview, Dihimba, January 29, 2010). 
An additional factor was the difficulty of tending to “old farms,” which after resettlement were 
often located some distance from where rural peoples lived. At the same time, the increasing 
material limitations of the Tanzanian state meant that the provision of social services was not 
nearly as widespread as had been promised (Lal 2010). For the most part, those who moved 
(whether long or short distances) did not experience the level of social service provision that 
was supposedly guaranteed within national(ist) political rhetoric. Even today, while such 
services are still relevant in contemporary conceptions of social development, it is widely 
argued within both in Mikindani and Dihimba that an increasing number of school buildings, 
hospitals, and health facilities are irrelevant given the lack of affordable medicine and doctors, 
the poor training of low paid and unmotivated teachers, and the shortages of necessary 
resources in schools.2 
 
It seems clear, then, that to the wazee of the Mtwara region the negative economic impact 
of villagization, coupled with the psychological trauma of forced resettlement, represents a 
significant occurrence in Tanzanian history. In spite of the fact that Mtwara, in terms of area, 
was the third smallest of the twenty-six regions of mainland Tanzania (as defined in 1976), 
more than one-eighth of all ujamaa villages were created in that region. This leads Killian 
(2003) to suggest that Mtwara (alongside Lindi, which had the second highest number of 
ujamaa villages) was something of a testing ground for this government experiment in social 
reorganization, which clearly destabilized the everyday lives of many in the rural majority. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that villagization is recounted as a significant historical “moment” 
around which the life narratives of many older people in Mtwara region are structured. They 
in fact tended to refer more to these memories than they did, for example, to the Arusha 
Declaration that precipitated villagization or even to the milestone of national independence— 
an observation also made by Schneider (2007) in another part of Tanzania. Compared to the 
lived experiences of national policies like villagization, independence does not seem to hold a 
particularly significant place in these “life narratives”: “Tanganyika became Tanzania and our 
flag changed, Elizabeth left and Nyerere arrived. The leaders knew about these changes but 
nothing changed for me, I’ve always been a farmer” (S. Mohammedi, interview, Dihimba, 
April 22, 2009). Here it is useful to recall the argument posed by Ellis (2002:6), that while 
sovereign independence was politically unstoppable across much of Africa during the late 
1950s and into the early 1960s, dividing African histories around this marker is problematic 
since it “was not a universal milestone, but is in reality a concept largely derived from studies 
of Europe and North America.” There is a tendency, in other words, for researchers to impose 
their own sense of historical periodizations rather than focusing on, and drawing out, those of 
the “researched” (see Toohey 2003). As such, independence does not seem to be a defining 
moment for all Tanzanians, and it might be argued that in this context, and perhaps in other 
African countries, independence was something of an elitist urban phenomenon. Those older 
people in Mtwara who do make reference to uhuru (taken to mean independence here) either 
associate it directly with forced resettlement or view it as something of an enigma and filled 
with a multitude of undelivered expectations. 
 
Among the people interviewed there was a clear understanding of some of the benefits of 
the economic liberalization that took place after villagization, often explained as the outcome 
of President Mwinyi’s having “opened the borders” to imports. Yet most of the new goods first 
made available during the 1980s—for example, fabric, shoes, and televisions—are not 
affordable to cash-poor older people, an argument particularly made by women, who tend to 
control household budgets: “We had enough money in the past, but now 100 shillings 
[US$0.05] is not enough to buy anything” (H. Selemani, interview, Mikindani, November 25, 
2009). The sorts of commodities (clothes, sugar, rice, tea, etc.) that were affordable in “the 
past” have seen considerable price increases as an outcome of liberalization (Bryceson 2002) 
and are now also in short supply (see Bernstein 1981; Ergas 1980). At the same time, the 
destruction of “traditional” support networks following forced resettlement means that 
shortages that previously had been absorbed within the community now burdened individuals 
and families. The emergence of NGOs and small-scale development projects from outside is 
not seen to have ameliorated these worsening conditions, a view that is informed by past 
experiences of “outside intervention” and the short-term creation of jobs in the region during 
the latter stages of the colonial period. Today the general perception is that only those who can 
obtain employment benefit from these projects, rather than project recipients themselves: 
“NGOs? . . . The only people from Mikindani that are involved are the workers, who benefit a 
little. . . . Most of us get nothing from them” (A. Shaibu, interview, Mikindani, June 29, 2009). 
 
Some of the complaints in Mtwara about the unfulfilled promises of uhuru, ujamaa, and 
villagization bought up perceptions of a particularly geographical bias: the lack of political will 
to provide necessary services in the south because Tanzanian politics “is dominated by those 
from the north” (S. A. Likolo, interview, Mikindani, July 25, 2012).3 Many agreed that this 
remains the case with more recent failures, for example, to deliver promised cashew nut 
subsidies or to complete the road to Dar-es-Salaam. National leaders are aware of what has 
been described as the belief in a “hidden agenda” (Wembah-Rashid 1998) working against 
southern Tanzania and are alarmed by a particular trend among southerners, which was indeed 
displayed by many informants, to identify themselves as Tanganyikan rather than Tanzanian. 
Former President Kikwete himself felt the need to challenge this practice in a 2009 public 
speech: “We are now done with the tale that people living in southern parts of the country were 
still Tanganyikans and those living in the northern part were real Tanzanians, that is now 
history” (The Citizen 2009). 
 
Yet among all of the narratives of complaint and disappointment expressed by many 
informants, the one positive memory of a development project that fulfilled its promises and 
stands out was a late colonial project: the Groundnut Scheme that was carried out in southern 
Tanganyika from the late 1940s and to the early 1950s. Almost without exception, this 
infrastructure project is regarded as a significant symbol of development from the past, one 
that brought stability, wage employment, clear material advancements, and technological 
improvements and is recalled with particular nostalgia by informants who had direct experience 
working on the Scheme itself or on the ancillary railroad project. 
 
 
The Formative Experience of the Groundnut Scheme 
 
The initiation of the Groundnut Scheme in 1947 in southern Tanganyika was part of larger 
changes in the management of African colonies in the period following World War II by the 
governments of both Britain and France, which sent “waves of experts” to reinvigorate 
colonialism by trans-forming farming and working methods and increasing the focus on 
education and welfare (Cooper 1997). The project was part of a broader shift in “late colonial 
development agendas” which, as Van Beusekom and Hodgson argue (2000:31), were “neither 
hegemonic nor unchanging . . . [and were] tied to both global changes and local realities of the 
late colonial era.” The election of an interventionist Labour government in Britain following 
the war led to a greatly expanded welfare state domestically and saw the emergence of large-
scale colonial development projects, exemplified by the Groundnut Scheme. The Scheme was 
a politically expedient project designed to produce groundnuts (peanuts) which would then be 
turned into food oils in order to challenge the U.S. monopoly over these products and reduce 
the cost for the British working class (Myddelton 2007). Vast tracts of land in the interior of 
southern Tanzania (around Nachingwea in Lindi region) were demarcated as huge farms for 
the production of groundnuts and a train line was built to connect these to the newly built port 
at Mtwara in preparation for the transport of the abundant crop. 
 
Rizzo (2006) argues that the Scheme and its related projects brought “a big boom to trade 
in the little township of (Old) Mikindani. . . . Despite a disappointing agricultural season, the 
local population seemed to be contented with plenty of money available, the effect of the 
unlimited demands for labor of all sorts” (2006:217). Large numbers of people were employed 
directly as part of the Groundnut Scheme or as part of related projects resulting from the 
increased investment that followed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. All of 
these projects led to significant labor migration into the region, where “men circulated to work 
at sisal plantations in Mikindani and what became the town of Mtwara on the coast, on smaller 
private farms in the interior as hired labourers, or on infrastructure projects catalyzed by the 
Groundnut Scheme . . .” (Lal 2010:10). 
 
By 1951, however, the Groundnut Scheme was abandoned. In the end, intense efforts to 
seed the crop meant that more groundnuts were imported into Tanganyika than were produced 
by the Scheme, which is now widely analyzed in the scholarly literature as a massive failure 
(see Myddelton 2007). According to the colonial authorities, a major problem was the acute 
shortage of consistently available unskilled labourers, a problem that was officially attributed 
to an inherent laziness on the part of local workers. In fact, the real problem was that the project 
mostly employed seasonal farmers on a casual basis who chose to farm land or to harvest crops 
when this work proved more lucrative (Rizzo 2006). Although an analysis of the ethnocentric 
perspective of the British—who labelled as “laziness” behaviour that could more rightly be 
described as an assertion of personal agency—is clearly beyond the scope of this article, an 
instructive comparison might be made between the Groundnut Scheme and the Maasai 
Development Project (also adopted in 1951), in which “the very willingness of Maasai to help 
finance local development projects and diversify their sources of income seems only to have 
reinforced officials’ vision of them as intransigent traditionalists who had to be compelled to 
help themselves” (Berry 2000;130; see also Hodgson 2000). The behaviour of the British in 
this case may also be compared to that of the French Office Du Niger, which did over time 
accommodate itself to the existing practices of farmers (see Van Beusekom 2000). 
 
It is also ironic that while the Scheme may have failed in relation to the stated objectives 
of the British, the experiences of those who participated, along with the technological 
improvements brought by the Scheme and the degree of personal agency it involved, are 
recalled fondly by many wazee in Mtwara. The construction of a railroad and the introduction 
of a train as part of the colonial project was one of the most common referents of development 
among wazee in Mikindani and Dihimba, juxtaposed with the contemporary reliance on 
expensive “broken buses” running on unpaved roads. The crumbling transport infrastructure in 
southern Tanzania today embodies a clear sign of regression, and while the train that was 
introduced as part of the Scheme only ran for a handful of years during the 1940s and 1950s, 
many reminisce over this cheap and effective means of transport: “I was happy because I used 
it to travel, as did many people. The train was like development for us, we could travel long 
distances cheaply and quickly, but we cannot do so anymore. The train was good, much better 
than what we have now” (S. H. Sululu, interview, Dihimba, September 8, 2009). 
 
Opportunities for work in “the past,” often as part of the Groundnut Scheme and ancillary 
projects, are also remembered fondly (especially by men), and many wazee view a short period 
in the latter stages of the colonial era as a time when the historical ostracism or maltreatment 
of southern Tanzania was effectively reversed (only to be reinstated later). A variety of jobs 
were created as part of the Groundnut Scheme, or on one of several sisal plantations in the 
region: “We collected soil and stones for the railway, or worked on the sisal estate. We could 
choose. . . . Companies were coming to Mtwara with different machines, I used to go to Mtwara 
to work, but the jobs have gone” (M. Hamisi, interview, Mikindani, March 4, 2010). This 
interviewee directly compared his decision to move to Mtwara for work in the late 1940s with 
the experience of being forced to move from Liwoye to Mikindani in the 1970s, emphasizing 
the personal agency in the earlier period as opposed to his powerlessness during villagization. 
Many saw the potential to procure casual employment as a clear benefit, both in Dihimba and 
in Mikindani, and as Rizzo (2006) points out, the Scheme created a localized economic boom. 
Elsewhere Rizzo (2009) demonstrates that opportunities for street hawking presented 
themselves to the most entrepreneurial and economically savvy in the interior at Nachingwea, 
moving us beyond assumptions that such a livelihood is an exclusively recent, urban 
phenomenon across Africa (see also Klaeger 2013). 
 
Regular references to the abundance of work in “the past,” then, draw from a trope of 
nostalgia and offer a reference point against which the absence of paid work today is criticized. 
For some informants in and around Mtwara town, the Scheme had a long-term impact on their 
lives, even after it formally concluded. One man, who acknowledged that his good fortune 
derived partly from the fact that his uncle worked in the colonial service, said 
 
My first work was building the train line. From 1947 I built the port [Mtwara] until it 
was finished in 1956. . . . I worked again after some years and in 1960 I performed kazi 
ya mikono [manual labour] at the port. After 1967 I was employed there again, at the 
port as a winch operator. I continued with that work until I retired. (A. Adeni, interview, 
Mikindani, May 15, 2009) 
 
He also expressed optimism for future industrialization in light of recent gas discoveries in the 
region. Nevertheless, even these positive representations of his previous working life and his 
hopes for the future were juxta-posed with vehement opposition to villagization because of the 
economic suffering of his family and what he saw as clear government deception concerning 
service provision. 
 
Many wazee do acknowledge that the wages paid in colonial times were low and 
exploitative. “Workers were getting one shilling a day for hard labor, which was not enough,” 
said one interviewee, a forestry expert trained in Arusha who organized a number of strikes 
over pay discrepancies between Tanganyikan and British workers in the 1950s and was 
eventually resettled in Mbinya (near to the Malawian border) by the colonial government 
(Mzee Nguruwe, interview, Mikindani, April 10, 2009). Nevertheless, the predominant view 
remains that despite the exploitative economic relations of the late colonial period, the 
guaranteed work was preferable to farming, which was the only alternative at the time and 
remains the main source of food and income generation today. While somewhat beyond the 
scope of this article, it is notable that like the informant quoted above, a number of those 
involved in this research project expressed a degree of optimism regarding the recent 
discoveries of offshore natural gas in the Mtwara region and framed this in light of their own 
past experience of major overseas investment and infrastructure expenditure. It can be argued 
that this, at least to some extent, reflects the sort of future-oriented nostalgia outlined by Piot 
(2010)—albeit in this instance a nostalgia that is informed in no small part by a brief but 
incredibly formative period of wage labor and perceived technological advancement. 
 
 
Concluding Comments: Development Nostalgia and Life Narratives 
 
In whichever ways wazee conceive of development, they generally see it as inaccessible or 
largely unavailable in southern Tanzania today, just as it has been since the formation of ujamaa 
villages: “Maendeleo? We had that in the past . . . ,” said one informant. “We wanted village 
development, but it [villagization] failed, and if you compare this time to the past, in the 
colonial era there was development. It was not a great time, but we did not bring development 
through ujamaa villages” (A. Ahmadi Chap., interview, Dihimba, July 12, 2009). This article 
contrasts the tendency within mainstream development literature to focus solely on the future 
(e.g., Crush 1995; Kothari 2005) with the complex reality that development can be viewed in 
terms of nostalgic glimpses into “the past.” This is exemplified by many wazee in Tanzania 
who have nostalgic feelings about development projects of the past, even ones, like the 
Groundnut Scheme, that are widely analyzed in the academic literature as abject failures. While 
their “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2004) has been diminished, what remains is a sense of 
nostalgia that functions as a kind of “aspiration without possibility, deploying sensibilities and 
values drawn from the past in the context of current struggles” (Bissell 2005:226). In focusing 
on these representations of the past, this article calls for and contributes to richer and more 
nuanced accounts of Tanzanian historiography. 
 
Wazee often argue that their “time has passed,” and it is important to acknowledge that the 
focus on this specific group is likely to result in a degree of nostalgia. Nevertheless, the 
characterization of “the past” as a time of low prices, clear technological advancement 
(especially in terms of the infrastructural changes brought about by the Groundnut Scheme), 
stability, and guaranteed employment, gives older people a benchmark against which to 
measure their contemporary situation and to categorize their experience of other historical 
processes. Many participants emphasized the significance of the infrastructural development 
of the 1950s, while those who had worked in the late colonial period as wage labourers (mostly 
men) were particularly positive and saw this experience as greatly preferable to forced 
migration and the failure to provide promised government services. Many of the women 
interviewed also echoed this sentiment, but made more direct reference to the prohibitively 
high prices brought about by the massive underproduction of food and by economic 
liberalization during the 1980s. It may be that exploitation by global capitalism is seen as 
contributing to ostracism, as argued by Katz (2004) in relation to South Sudan and similar to 
what Ferguson (1999) sees as “abjection” in Zambia following the collapse of the copper 
mining industry in the 1970s. 
 
In light of this research, it will be interesting to see whether the expectations already 
generated by the recent discovery of large reserves of natural gas off the coast of southern 
Tanzania will ever be met. Further fieldwork that I have conducted in Mtwara (see Ahearne 
2013) suggests otherwise, however, and recent protests in Mtwara over the supposedly unequal 
distribution of revenues generated from natural gas seem to frame this as part of the continued 
mistreatment of the south. The radical and repeated narratives from protestors of “gesi ibaki au 
tugawane nchi” (“the gas [and related wealth] should remain here or we must divide the 
country”) call for greater regional benefits or outright secession. In terms of current attitudes, 
however, the generational differences in regard to notions of development are stark. The 
younger generations do not want to feel exploited, while their elders perhaps feel that brief 
experiences of sacrifice for the sake of shared goals for the future are preferable to ostracism 
and continued marginalization (see Ahearne 2011).44 The disappointments of villagization and 
of promises that have not been fulfilled foments a strong sense of nostalgia and provides some 
of the reasons that maendeleo is so often understood as a thing of “the past.” 
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